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Financial crises can have severe negative effects on investment. One reason for this is that ﬁnancial crises
increase uncertainty, increasing the real option value of delaying investment. In this paper, we show that the
negative effect of crises on investment differs signiﬁcantly across countries: in countries with low tolerance
for uncertainty, the negative effect is strong. The negative effect is absent in countries that aremore tolerant of
uncertainty. These ﬁndings are similar across different types of ﬁnancial crisis; they vary as predicted across
type of investor, asset and industry; and they are not driven by uncertainty-averse countries adopting more
rigid institutions.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Financial crises have large economic consequences. Many studies
focus on the effect on GDP growth, e.g. Hutchison and Noy (2005) ﬁnd
that currency or banking crises decrease output by 5 to 10% after (up
to) four years. In a recent contribution, Joyce and Nabar (2009)
showed how banking crises have a severe negative impact on
investment, leading to a faster drop in investment than in output.1
One reason for this is that a ﬁnancial crisis is typically a period of
heightened uncertainty and as Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2007)
show, ﬁrms typically delay their investments in uncertain times.2 As
an illustration, Fig. 1 shows how uncertainty, proxied by the implied
volatility of the U.S. stock market, rose dramatically in late 2008 as the
ﬁnancial crisis took hold there.3
However, not everyone reacts to uncertainty in the same way:
individuals in some societies go to greater lengths to avoid
uncertainty than those in other societies. This difference in the
response to uncertainty shocks can have substantial effects on
economic outcomes. In their overview of the literature, Guiso et al.
(2006) argue that cultural factors have clear effects on economic
outcomes.4 A more speciﬁc example is Huang (2008), who shows that
informationally opaque industries grow faster in countries with a
greater tolerance for uncertainty.
In this paper, we analyze how the effect of a ﬁnancial crisis on
investment differs across countries. For this analysis, we construct a
dataset covering 74 countries for the period 1970–2005, using the
Hofstede (2001) data to measure the degree of uncertainty avoidance
in each country. Financial crises are identiﬁed based on a new
database by Laeven and Valencia (2008), which distinguishes
between three types of crises: currency, banking and debt crises.
We ﬁnd that investment signiﬁcantly decreases relative to GDP
only in countries that exhibit a high degree of uncertainty avoidance.
We also ﬁnd that each type of ﬁnancial crisis has an effect on
investment that is very similar in size and almost the same set of
countries experiences a signiﬁcant drop in investment after any type
of ﬁnancial crisis. In contrast, the existing literature on how crises
affect the real economy tends to focus on crisis-speciﬁc explanations,
such as how a currency crisis affects the decision of multinationals to
invest in a local subsidiary5; how a banking crisis can hamper the
channeling of savings into investment6; or how private ﬁrms have less
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1 Other studies analyzing the effect of crises on investment include Edwards (2002)
and Park et al., 2003.
2 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) on real option theory in general. Speciﬁcally, this
insight has pervaded the study of ﬁrm investment behavior; see e.g. the survey by
Carruth et al. (2000).
3 This ﬁgure is modeled on a similar ﬁgure in Bloom (2009).
4 In this paper we follow the argument in the literature that differences in values,
such as uncertainty avoidance, will also exist within countries but that comparing
averages of these values across countries is potentially meaningful.
5 Bosworth and Collins (1999).
6 Calvo et al. (2004).
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access to international debt markets after a sovereign debt crisis.7
However, it seems plausible that any crisis increases uncertainty
about the future, providing an explanation for the similarity in the
negative response of investment across different types of crisis.
To strengthen our ﬁndings we also consider various ways of
splitting up total investment.8 We hypothesize that cross-country
heterogeneity in the response to a ﬁnancial crisis would:
1) only hold for private investment but not for public investment as
political considerations would likely trump comparisons of real
option values;
2) be stronger for investment in structures than for investment in
machinery and equipment since structures are longer-lived assets
and hence a longer-lasting drag on costs in case of an untimely
investment;
3) be less important for investment by industries that are already
highly volatile since such industries would tend to drawmore risk-
averse investors.9 Alternatively, ﬁnancial crises add relatively less
to total industry uncertainty compared with less-volatile
industries.
A distinction between public and private investment and between
investment in structures and machinery and equipment is not readily
available for the range of countries we consider, so we develop new
estimates using National Accounts, UNIDO industry statistics and
trade data. Industry investment is sourced from the UNIDO INDSTAT3
database and we deﬁne highly volatile industries using the standard
deviation of daily stock returns of global sectoral stock indices from
Datastream.10 Our empirical results provide support for each of these
three hypotheses.
To establish the robustness of our ﬁndings, we also consider a
number of econometric techniques, from ﬁxed-effect estimation to
dynamic-panel data models.11 We account for the possible endo-
geneity of the tolerance for uncertainty by using religious composition
of the population as instruments (following Huang, 2008) and
consider a range of legal and governance indicators that could be
more proximate causes for our ﬁndings. For example, more
uncertainty-averse countries may adopt stricter employment-protec-
tion regulations and such regulations may also increase the
adjustment costs to capital. We also examine a wide range of other
variables that could affect investment or investment after a crisis,
including openness to trade, ﬁnancial openness, foreign direct
investment and ﬁnancial development. Finally, we restrict our sample
to various classes, such as low-income countries, as well as examine
various alternative measures for uncertainty avoidance. Throughout
these robustness checks, our main result stands: ﬁnancial crises have
a signiﬁcant negative effect on investment only in countries with a
low tolerance for uncertainty. And, as far as we are able to establish,
this does not reﬂect a more rigid regulatory or political system but
may instead reﬂect the risk preferences of ﬁrm owners.
This does not imply that ﬁnancial crises have no economic
consequences in countries with a low degree of uncertainty
avoidance. Since we measure investment relative to GDP, our ﬁndings
indicate that investment does not fall by signiﬁcantly more than GDP
in these countries. The results do imply that the long-term
consequences of a ﬁnancial crisis will be less severe, since the
accumulation of capital is less affected than in countries with a high
degree of uncertainty avoidance. We are also not claiming that
ﬁnancial crises only have an economic effect through increased
uncertainty, but we do argue that the degree of uncertainty aversion
plays an important role in how an economy responds to a ﬁnancial
crisis.12This ﬁnding is useful as it suggests that policy makers should
take steps to reduce uncertainty to mitigate the economic effects of a
ﬁnancial crisis. Such conﬁdence-building steps would be particularly
important in countries that have low tolerance for uncertainty. More
generally, it emphasizes in a new context the importance of cultural
differences on economic outcomes.
2. Data
In this study we cover 74 countries, the maximum number for
which data on the degree of uncertainty avoidance is available (see
Table 3 for a full list). For each of these countries, we also have
information on investment, GDP and whether a ﬁnancial crisis took



















































Fig. 1. Daily US implied stock market volatility, 1990–2009.
7 Arteta and Hale (2008). Their ﬁnding could be explained by a lower willingness of
foreign creditors to lend money, but also by an uncertainty-induced drop in demand
for funds.
8 We thank an anonymous referee and the editor for these suggestions.
9 See e.g. Barsky et al. (1997) and Dohmen et al. (2011) for the effect of differences
in risk preferences for investment behavior.
10 This identiﬁcation strategy is in the same spirit as that of Bekaert et al. (2007).
11 Namely the Arrelano and Bover (1991) (Difference-GMM) and Blundell and Bond
(1995)/Arellano and Bover (1998) System-GMM estimators.
12 Direct measures of uncertainty, as used in Fig. 1, do not have the strong effects we
ﬁnd for ﬁnancial crises.
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some of the formerly Communist countries, there is no data for the
1970s and 1980s, but on average we have more than 32 years of
observations per country. In addition to our core data, we also
collected data on numerous other variables that we use in our
robustness analysis. All variables are brieﬂy described in Table 1 and
some are discussed in more detail in the data appendix.
We identify ﬁnancial crises using a new database constructed by
Laeven and Valencia (2008). They consider three types of ﬁnancial
crisis, namely a (systemic) banking crisis, a currency crisis and a
(sovereign) debt crisis. The banking crises database extends the
earlier work by Caprio et al. (2005), which is already widely used. We
do not consider abrupt reversals of capital ﬂows, ‘sudden stops’, as a
separate type of crisis since Joyce and Nabar (2009) show that a
sudden stop only has a negative effect on investment in the presence
of a banking crisis. As outlined in Table 1, a banking crisis is identiﬁed
as a situation where systemically important ﬁnancial institutions are
in distress. Financial distress of isolated banks is therefore not
considered a banking crisis. A banking crisis is said to occur if there
is a deposit run; a deposit freeze or blanket guarantee; extensive
liquidity support; bank interventions; a large proportion of non-
performing loans; or an exhaustion of capital of the banking system.
Currency crises are identiﬁed as a year with a rapidly depreciating
Table 1
List of variables, deﬁnitions and sources.
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Crises
Bank crisis Systemically important ﬁnancial institutions are in distress (0/1) Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Currency crisis Depreciation of the nominal exchange rate of at least 30% that is at least a 10% faster
depreciation than the year before (0/1)
Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Debt crisis Sovereign default to private lending (0/1) Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Financial crisis Bank, currency or debt crisis (0/1) Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Investment and output
Investment The log of (gross ﬁxed capital formation at constant prices divided by GDP at constant prices) UN National Accounts
Growth Annual growth of GDP at constant prices UN National Accounts
Public investment The log of (government gross ﬁxed capital formation at constant prices divided by GDP at
constant prices)
UN National Accounts, EU KLEMS,
National Accounts Argentina, see Data
Appendix
Private investment The log of (total minus government gross ﬁxed capital formation at constant prices divided
by GDP at constant prices)
UN National Accounts, EU KLEMS,
National Accounts Argentina,
see Data Appendix
Structure investment The log of (construction industry output at constant prices divided by GDP at constant prices) UN National Accounts, EU KLEMS, OECD
and GTAP IO tables, see Data Appendix
Machinery & eq. investment The log of (investment equipment industry output plus imports minus exports at constant
prices divided by GDP at constant prices)
UNIDO INDSTAT3 and 4, World Trade
Flows, see Data Appendix
Industry investment The log of (industry gross ﬁxed capital formation divided by industry value added) UNIDO INDSTAT3, see Data Appendix
Industry volatility The standard deviation of daily sectoral stock index returns Datastream, see Data Appendix
WDI I/Y log of (Investment to GDP ratio) World Bank (2007)
Cultural and religious characteristics
UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index Hofstede (2001)
Hoppe UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index from Hoppe's Survey on Salzburg Seminar Elite Alumni Hofstede (2001)
EMMS UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index from European Media and Marketing Survey (EMMS) Hofstede (2001)
WVS Risk-loving Weighted score based on question 'How important is adventure and risk-taking' with higher
scores indicating less afﬁnity with risk-taking
World Values Survey, 2005–07 wave
Protestant share Share of protestants in the population in 1980 Barrett (1982); from La Porta et al. (1999)
Catholic share Share of catholics in the population in 1980 Barrett (1982); from La Porta et al. (1999)
Economic control variables
Interest rate Lending interest rate World Bank (2007)
Inﬂation Annual change in the GDP deﬂator World Bank (2007)
Trade Openness Trade (Imports+Exports) (% of GDP) UN National Accounts
Debt service Total debt services (% of GDP) World Bank (2007)
FDI Foreign direct investment (% of GDP) World Bank (2007)
Terms of trade Change in terms of trade (%) World Bank (2007)
Fin. Openness Foreign assets+liabilities (% of GDP) Lane et Milesi-Ferretti (2007), updated &
extended
Fin. Develop. Private credit by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial institutions (% of GDP) Beck et al., (2000), updated
Institutional and governmental control variables
Emp. Protect. Index of protection of labor and employment laws based on hiring and ﬁring and working
hours regulations
Botero et at., (2004)
Formalism Legal formalism index, average of check and eviction case Djankov et at., (2003)
Case law Dummy variable that is one if case law is a source of law La Porta et al. (2004)
Voice Voice and accountability index, average over 1996–2009 World Governance Indicators 1996–2009,
Kaufman et al. (2010)
Stability Political stability index, average over 1996–2009 World Governance Indicators 1996–2009,
Kaufman et al. (2010)
Effectiveness Government effectiveness index, average over 1996–2009 World Governance Indicators 1996–2009,
Kaufman et al. (2010)
Reg. Qual. Regulatory quality index, average over 1996–2009 World Governance Indicators 1996–2009,
Kaufman et al. (2010)
Rule of Law Rule of Law index, average over 1996–2009 World Governance Indicators 1996–2009,
Kaufmann et al. (2010)
Corruption Control of corruption index, average over 1996–2009 World Governance Indicators 1996–2009,
Kaufman et al. (2010)
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exchange rate, building on the approach of Frankel and Rose (1996). A
debt crisis refers to the year of a sovereign default on privately held
debt.
Table 2 provides an overview of the frequency with which these
crises occur in our sample, while Table 3 shows the crisis years for the
list of countries by type of crisis.13 Financial crises are fairly rare in this
sample, occurring in 159 of the country/year observations. This
corresponds to 6% of all country/year observations. There are only a
few cases where two or even all three types of crises occur in the same
year. Given the rarity of double and triple crises, we do not examine
these separately in our analysis. Furthermore, Hutchison and Noy
(2005) do not ﬁnd evidence of feedbacks or interactive effects of
combined banking and currency crises.
For our analysis, we rely on the uncertainty avoidance data
constructed by Hofstede (2001). The work of Hofstede (1980, 2001)
has donemuch to show how people that are in many ways similar can
still have very different values and attitudes depending on the country
fromwhich they originate. Hofstede's surveyswere done around 1970
and covered 88 000 IBM employees working in similar marketing and
customer service positions. This should eliminate numerous idiosyn-
cratic differences between people and help focus on the cross-country
differences. Hofstede distinguishes four cultural dimensions but we
focus on uncertainty avoidance.14 He deﬁnes uncertainty avoidance as
“feeling uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, and therefore
valuing beliefs and institutions that provide certainty and conformi-
ty.” This overall measure is based on the responses to three questions,
namely:
1) Rule orientation: the importance to the respondent of abiding by
company rules;
2) Employment stability: how many years the respondent is likely to
continue working for the company; and
3) Stress: whether the respondent frequently experiences stress.
Hofstede (2001) gives a more extensive discussion of these
surveys, including psychological motivation, but this is also available
in a more compact fashion in Huang (2008). The uncertainty
avoidance indicator has been used in a range of other recent studies
to establish a link between this cultural factor and economic
outcomes, for example, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) and Kwok and
Tadesse (2006). A more general discussion of the effect of culture on
economic outcomes is given in Guiso et al. (2006) and Beugelsdijk and
Maseland (2010).
Table 3 provides a list of countries we cover and their degree of
uncertainty avoidance according to Hofstede (2001). As indicated by
asterisks, not all scores reported in the ﬁrst column are based on
Hofstede's original survey work. In particular, some have been
estimated by Hofstede, while for some countries in the Middle East
and Africa, survey responses have been pooled so that, e.g. Kenya and
Tanzania have the same score. Our results are very similar if the
countries denoted by asterisks are removed from the sample; see
Table 9. As discussed in Hofstede (2001), there have been two
alternative surveys on uncertainty avoidance that are based on
different sets of respondents and taken at different times.15 A
drawback of these alternative surveys is that they cover many fewer
countries.
We also include a measure based on the World Values Survey
(WVS). This survey has no direct counterpart to the concept of
uncertainty avoidance, but it does contain a question on the
importance of risk and adventure for the respondent. We construct
this measure so that a higher value corresponds to a lower afﬁnity to
risk and adventure.16 A drawback of the WVS is that the sample is not
as homogenous as that of Hofstede, potentially introducing idiosyn-
cratic factors into this measure, and the fact that it measures a
different concept. As the ﬁnal line of Table 3 shows, the various
measures of uncertainty avoidance are all positively correlated, and
quite strongly for the Hoppe and EMMS measures.
The next two columns of Table 3 show the share of Catholics and
Protestants in the population in 1980. The hypothesis is that religious
background may have some explanatory power for the degree of
uncertainty avoidance. This follows Weber (1930) who argued that
there is a link between the Protestant Reformation and the rise of
capitalism. He quotes from a study of German Catholics and
Protestants: “The Catholic is quieter, having less of the acquisitive
impulse; he prefers a life of the greatest possible security, even with a
smaller income, to a life of risk and excitement, even though it may
bring the chance of gaining honour and riches. The proverb says
jokingly, ‘either eat well or sleep well’. In the present case the
Protestant prefers to eat well, the Catholic to sleep undisturbed.”17
The correlation between the share of these religions in the population
and uncertainty avoidance is indeed as hypothesized with more
Catholic countries showing a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance
and more Protestant countries a lower degree.18 The broader
distinction between Catholics and Protestants has also been exploited
in a number of more recent studies, e.g. Landes (1998), La Porta et al.
(1999) and Huang (2008).
3. Methodology
Our basic model for estimating the effect of uncertainty avoidance
on investment builds on that of Joyce and Nabar (2009). Our
dependent variable is the log of real investment over real GDP (iy)
in country i in year t, which we explain using the following model19:






it × UAIi + γ2C
k
it−1





where C is a dummy that is one when a country experienced a crisis of
type k in that year and zero otherwise. As discussed in the previous
Table 2
Financial crisis descriptive statistics.
Type of crisis # of obs Frequency (%)
No crisis 2505 94.0
Any ﬁnancial crisis 159 6.0
Only banking crisis 53 2.0
Only currency crisis 76 2.9
Only debt crisis 14 0.5
Banking & currency crisis 4 0.2
Banking & debt crisis 0 0.0
Currency & debt crisis 8 0.3
Banking, currency & debt crisis 4 0.2
Total # of country/year observations 2664 100
13 Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the other variables.
14 The other three dimensions are masculinity, power distance and individuality. The
scores on these dimensions show very low correlations (b0.2) with the scores on
uncertainty avoidance.
15 These are Hoppe's Survey on Salzburg Seminar Elite Alumni and European Media and
Marketing Survey (EMMS) 1997.
16 The answers to this question were given on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from
‘very much like me’ to ‘not at all like me’. These answers were given a weight going
from −2.5 for ‘very much like me’ to +2.5 for ‘not at all like me’ at 1-point intervals.
The share of respondents in each category was multiplied with this weight and the
sum of this provides the score shown in Table 3.
17 The original study is in German, Offenbacher (1901).
18 The (absolute) correlations increase from about 0.4 to 0.6-0.7 if the countries with
very few Christians (a combined share less than 20%) are removed.
19 This model presupposes a cointegrating relationship between investment and
GDP. A more ﬂexible formulation where the cointegrating relationship is estimated
and investment is used as the dependent variable, as in e.g. Davis and Stone (2004),
leads to very similar results.
469R. Inklaar, J. Yang / Journal of Development Economics 97 (2012) 466–480
Author's personal copy
Table 3
Uncertainty avoidance and religious composition.
Uncertainty avoidance index Risk loving Religious composition
in 1980
Financial crises
Hofstede Hoppe EMMS WVS Catholic Protestant Currency Banking Debt
Argentina 0.86 0.76 91.6 2.7 1975, 1981, 1987, 2002 1980, 1989, 1995, 2001 1982, 2001
Australia 0.51 0.66 29.6 23.5
Austria 0.70 0.33 0.50 88.8 6.5
Bangladesh 0.60* 0.2 0.2 1976 1987
Belgium 0.94 0.67 0.78 90.0 0.4
Brazil 0.76 0.98 87.8 4.0 1976, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1999 1990, 1994 1983
Bulgaria 0.85* 0.42 0.5 0.4 1996 1996 1990
Canada 0.48 0.33 46.6 29.6
Chile 0.86 0.47 82.1 1.9 1972, 1982 1976, 1981 1983
China, P.R. 0.30* 1.09 0.0 0.0 1998
Colombia 0.80 96.6 0.9 1985 1982, 1998
Costa Rica 0.86 90.5 5.8 1981, 1991 1987, 1994 1981
Czech Republic 0.74* 39.2 4.6 1996
Denmark 0.23 −0.02 0.07 0.6 95.2
Ecuador 0.67 96.4 1.9 1982, 1999 1982,1998 1982, 1999
Egypt 0.68** 1.14 0.2 0.2 1979, 1990 1980 1984
El Salvador 0.94 96.2 2.4 1986 1989
Estonia 0.60* 2.0 66.0 1992 1992
Ethiopia 0.52** −0.16 0.7 3.8 1993
Finland 0.59 0.31 0.34 0.75 0.1 93.1 1993 1991
France 0.86 0.54 0.90 0.60 76.4 2.4
Germany 0.65 0.37 0.62 1.03 35.0 46.4
Ghana 0.54** −0.72 18.7 25.8 1978, 1983, 1993, 2000 1982
Greece 1.12 0.47 0.4 0.1 1983
Guatemala 1.01 94.0 4.9 1986
Hong Kong 0.29 7.9 7.5
Hungary 0.82* 53.9 21.6 1991
India 0.40 −0.52 1.3 1.1 1993
Indonesia 0.48 −0.39 2.7 4.8 1979, 1998 1997 1999
Ireland 0.35 0.35 0.49 95.3 1.1
Israel 0.81 1.0 0.2 1975, 1980, 1985 1977
Italy 0.75 0.44 0.79 83.2 0.4 1981
Jamaica 0.13 9.6 55.5 1978, 1983, 1991 1996 1978
Japan 0.92 1.34 0.6 0.9 1997
Kenya 0.52** 26.4 19.3 1993 1985, 1992
Korea, Republic of 0.85 −0.02 3.9 12.2 1998 1997
Kuwait 0.68** 2.1 0.1 1982
Lebanon 0.68** 36.2 1.0 1984, 1990 1990
Libya 0.68** 0.2 0.1 2002
Luxembourg 0.70* 93.0 1.2
Malaysia 0.36 0.30 2.8 1.4 1998 1997
Mexico 0.82 0.59 94.7 1.2 1977, 1982, 1995 1981, 1994 1982
Morocco 0.68* 0.18 0.2 0.0 1981 1980 1983
Netherlands 0.53 0.14 0.45 0.47 42.6 42.4
New Zealand 0.49 18.7 37.9
Nigeria 0.54** 12.1 15.8 1983, 1989, 1997 1991 1983
Norway 0.50 0.22 0.33 0.15 0.3 97.8 1991
Pakistan 0.70 0.5 0.8 1972
Panama 0.86 85.0 5.2 1988 1983
Peru 0.87 0.71 95.1 2.7 1976, 1981, 1988 1983 1978
Philippines 0.44 84.1 3.8 1983, 1998 1983, 1997 1983
Poland 0.93* 0.22 81.0 0.1 1992 1981
Portugal 1.04 0.24 0.81 94.1 1.1 1983
Romania 0.90* 0.87 4.9 5.8 1996 1990 1982
Russia 0.95* 0.76 1.4 0.0 1998 1998 1998
Saudi Arabia 0.68** 0.1 0.1
Sierra Leone 0.54** 2.2 4.8 1983, 1989, 1998 1990 1977
Singapore 0.08 4.7 2.6
Slovakia 0.51* 74.0 8.4 1998
South Africa 0.49 −0.21 10.4 39.0 1984 1985
Spain 0.86 0.27 0.90 0.27 96.9 0.1 1983 1977
Suriname 0.92* 36.0 36.6 1990, 1995, 2001
Sweden 0.29 0.08 0.09 0.54 1.4 68.4 1993 1991
Switzerland 0.58 0.44 0.62 0.81 52.8 43.2
Tanzania 0.52** 28.2 11.2 1985, 1990 1987 1984
Thailand 0.64 0.15 0.4 0.2 1998 1983, 1997
Trinidad and Tobago 0.55* 0.21 35.8 13.2 1986 1989
Turkey 0.85 0.39 0.27 0.1 0.0 1978, 1984, 1991, 1996, 2001 1982, 2000 1978
United Kingdom 0.35 0.33 0.54 0.30 13.1 16.1
United States 0.46 0.16 0.54 30.0 43.6 1988
Uruguay 1.00 0.88 59.5 1.9 1972, 1983, 1990, 2002 1981, 2002 1983, 2002
Venezuela 0.76 94.8 1.0 1984, 1989, 1994, 2002 1994 1982
Vietnam 0.30* 0.79 3.9 0.2 1972, 1981, 1987 1997 1985
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section, our data cover three types of ﬁnancial crises: banking, currency
and debt crises. As our fourth and main ‘type’, we deﬁne C to be equal to
one if any of these three crises occurred. The reason for focusing on this
deﬁnition is that anyﬁnancial crisis is likely to lead to aperiodof increased
uncertainty, but we also analyze the three types separately. We also
include a lagged value of the crisis variable since the effects of a crisismay
take longer thanayear todissipate. Inparticular if a crisis occurs late in the
year, the effects may well spill over into the next. In addition to the crises
variable,we includecountryandyearﬁxedeffects, denotedbyαiandαt, to
capture time-invariant country-speciﬁc factors and shocks that are
common across countries in a single year.
We also include other control variables, denoted byX. In our baseline
model, we include just the lagged dependent variable and lagged GDP
growth. Since we aim to maximize the number of countries covered to
identify the cross-country heterogeneity in response to a crisis, we
cannot have many control variables in our baseline speciﬁcation.
However, aswe show in the robustness analysis (Table 8), the inclusion
of other variables does not affect our main result.
Of key interest in this study are the interaction effects between
current and lagged crises and the country uncertainty avoidance
index. The signiﬁcance of these interaction effects provide some
information, but the main focus should be on the marginal effects to
ﬁnd out how investment responds to a ﬁnancial crisis in countries
with different degrees of tolerance for uncertainty20:
∂iyit
∂Cit
= β1 + γ1UAIi ð2Þ
and a similar calculation can bemade for the effects of a crisis a year ago.
When analyzing the robustness of our ﬁndings, the key issue is
how any control variables may inﬂuence the marginal effect from
equation (2). We therefore interact any control variable with current
and lagged crises and evaluate the following marginal effect:
∂iyit
∂Cit
= β1 + γ1UAIi + δj2X
j
it ð3Þ
where δj2 is the coefﬁcient on the interaction between a crisis
(current or lagged) and control variable j.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we also analyze to what extent
industries show a different response to a ﬁnancial crisis, depending on
the uncertainty aversion of the country and the volatility of the
industry21:
iyikt = αik + αt + β1iyikt−1 + β2Cit + β3Cit × UAIi + β4Cit
× Vk + β5Cit × UAIi × Vk + εikt
ð4Þ
In this equation, we analyze the investment-output ratio in
country i, industry k at time t. V is the volatility of industry k and is
taken as constant across countries and over time. Industry volatility is
measured as the standard deviation of daily stock market returns of
global sectoral indexes compiled by Datastream. These indexes have
earlier been used by Bekaert et al. (2007), who argue that their global
nature make them exogenous to economic developments in any
particular country. By also averaging over time, this exogeneity is
further strengthened and allows us to compare how the investment
response to a crisis varies not just by country uncertainty aversion but
also by industry volatility. To that end, we evaluate the following




= β2 + β3UAIi + β4Vk + β5UAIi × Vk ð5Þ
4. Results
Column (1) in Table 4 shows the results for a model with just a
current crisis as an explanatory variable in addition to lagged
investment and lagged growth. The column is labeled ‘FE’ for ﬁxed
effects to denote that country ﬁxed effects are included (in addition
to year effects) and that this equation is estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS). Investment is a very persistent process as the
coefﬁcient on lagged investment is large and highly signiﬁcant. This
could reﬂect partial adjustment in investment behavior.22 Lagged
growth is only signiﬁcant at a 10% level (and insigniﬁcant in some of
the other speciﬁcations), suggesting that for this sample of 74
countries, a ﬂexible accelerator effect is not very clear. The effect of
a ﬁnancial crisis is highly signiﬁcant and substantial, reducing
investment by over 5% relative to GDP. This means the investment
to GDP ratio drops by about 1 percentage point, close in size to what
Joyce and Nabar (2009) ﬁnd. The explanatory power of the regression
is sizeable with a (within) adjusted R-squared of about 75%, though
the lagged dependent variable accounts for much of this. The second
column shows that the effect one year after a crisis is even more
considerable, implying a total drop in investment relative to GDP of
more than 12%, or more than 2 percentage points.23
The third column adds the two interaction effects, for current and
lagged crises. This causes the crisis and lagged crisis coefﬁcient to turn
positive, but these coefﬁcients now measure the effect of a ﬁnancial
crisis in a (hypothetical) country where UAI is equal to zero (see
equation (2)). Both interaction terms are negative and signiﬁcant,
though the lagged interaction only at the 10-percent level. Since UAI is
always larger than zero, the point estimate of the marginal effect from
equation (2) is never positive, let alone signiﬁcantly so. The country
Table 3 (continued)
Uncertainty avoidance index Risk loving Religious composition
in 1980
Financial crises
Hofstede Hoppe EMMS WVS Catholic Protestant Currency Banking Debt
Zambia 0.52** −0.28 26.2 31.9 1983, 1989, 1996 1995 1983
Correlation with Hofstede UAI 0.64 0.85 0.30 0.42 −0.40
Source: UAI data based on Hofstede (2001), original index divided by 100. Hofstede is the data from his original survey and further estimates; see Table 1 for further sources and
variable descriptions.
* Estimated by Hofstede (2001).
** Regional ﬁgure for Arab World (Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Saudi Arabia), East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia) or West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra
Leone).
20 See Brambor et al. (2006) for more on estimating and interpreting interaction
models. They recommend including both constituent terms in a regression but since
UAI does not vary over time, this variable cannot be included alongside the country
ﬁxed effects. Dropping country ﬁxed effects and including UAI separately does not
change the results. All marginal effects and corresponding standard errors are
estimated using the Stata lincom command.
21 Lagged crises as well as other control variables are omitted from this equation,
both for brevity and because they had no additional explanatory power in the
regressions.
22 See Thomas (2002) on partial adjustment mechanisms.
23 A ﬁnancial crisis that occurred two years ago no longer has a signiﬁcant effect. One
possible reason that one lag is signiﬁcant and two lags is not could be that if a ﬁnancial
crisis occurs in the second half of a calendar year, the effects will be felt in the current
and next year, while the uncertainty shock will have had time to wear of for the year
after, see also Bloom (2009) on the dynamic effects of uncertainty shocks.
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with the highest UAI is Greece with an index of 1.12. This means that
in a crisis year, the investment to GDP ratio would drop by more than
11% compared with an average negative effect of 5%.24
The statistical signiﬁcance of these results is shown in Fig. 2, which
plots the marginal effect together with the 95-percent conﬁdence
interval. This ﬁgure shows that in the year a ﬁnancial crisis occurs,
investment falls signiﬁcantly relative to GDP in countries with a UAI
above 0.56, which means countries that are less tolerant of
uncertainty than, roughly Switzerland, or 45 out of the 74 countries
in the sample. The investment response to a crisis a year ago turns
signiﬁcantly negative for a similar group of countries, namely those
with a UAI above 0.49 or 57 out of 74 countries. Though we could
make a ﬁgure similar to Fig. 2 for each speciﬁcation that includes these
interaction terms, we save space by only reporting the value of UAI
where the 95% upper bound of the marginal effect turns negative, so
in column (3), these values are 0.56 and 0.49.
After a ﬁnancial crisis, the majority of countries experiences a
signiﬁcant decline in investment relative to GDP, but a sizeable
minority does not, including Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK
and US. This does not reﬂect an absence of ﬁnancial crises in countries
with low UAI scores. About 40% of the countries have a UAI lower than
0.56 and these countries experienced about 35% of the ﬁnancial crises
(see Appendix Fig. 1 for the full distribution).
The speciﬁcation in column (3) includes a lagged value of the
dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables, and OLS no
longer is consistent in that case. Moreover, there could be endogeneity
concerns not adequately addressed by the inclusion of country ﬁxed
effects. Column (4) shows results using the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimator proposed byArrelano and Bond (1991) and
column (5) shows results using the GMM-estimator suggested by
Arrelano and Bover (1998) and Blundell and Bond (1995). In column
(4), labeled ‘Diff-GMM’, the estimating equation is ﬁrst-differenced and
higher lags of dependent and explanatory variables are used as
instruments. In column (5), labeled ‘Sys-GMM’, a system is estimated
where lagged levels of variables are used as instruments for an equation
in ﬁrst differences (the Diff-GMM case) but also vice versa. 25 The
estimation results are very similar to the FE results from column (3)
except that the interaction effects are larger and more signiﬁcant, but
the group of countries where a ﬁnancial crisis leads to a drop in
investment is somewhat smaller.26 The test for overidentifying re-
strictions shows a serious problem with these speciﬁcations though.27
Under the null hypothesis of this test, the instruments are valid and this
null hypothesis is overwhelmingly rejected. In other words, lagged
differences of the crises dummy are not very good predictors of actual
crises: not very surprising since ﬁnancial crises are comparatively rare
occurrences.28 In other words, the GMM estimators do not lead to
satisfactory models.29
To deal with the problem of a lagged dependent variable, a more
radical solution is to use the change in the investment/GDP ratio as
the dependent variable, rather than the level. Column (6) shows the
results from estimating this model. The contemporaneous interaction
term is still signiﬁcantly negative, while the lagged interaction term is
not. More importantly, the marginal effect is signiﬁcantly negative for
a very similar set of countries as in column (3). So these results show
that the lagged dependent variable does not cause substantial
estimation problems and that even country-speciﬁc trends in the
Table 4
Investment, ﬁnancial crises and uncertainty avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimation method FE FE FE Diff-GMM Sys-GMM FE IV
Lagged investment 0.844*** 0.844*** 0.842*** 0.958*** 0.913*** 0.842***
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0613) (0.0372) (0.0163)
Lagged growth 0.289* 0.274* 0.253* 0.0526 0.132 0.195 0.256*
(0.166) (0.156) (0.152) (0.200) (0.207) (0.142) (0.153)
Financial crisis −0.0533*** −0.0576*** 0.0376 0.104** 0.110** 0.0474 0.0208
(0.0163) (0.0152) (0.0490) (0.0472) (0.0489) (0.0523) (0.0810)
Lagged ﬁnancial crisis −0.0658*** 0.0176 0.0562 0.0818 0.0228 0.103
(0.0110) (0.0466) (0.0641) (0.0593) (0.0528) (0.0702)
Financial crisis×UAI −0.134** −0.229*** −0.233*** −0.151** −0.112
(0.0644) (0.0627) (0.0651) (0.0684) (0.116)
Lagged ﬁnancial crisis×UAI −0.112* −0.173** −0.211*** −0.110 −0.241**
(0.0606) (0.0816) (0.0786) (0.0676) (0.0994)
Marginal effect of a crisis signiﬁcantly negative for countries with a UAI exceeding
Contemporaneous 0.56 0.61 0.62 0.57 0.57
Lagged 0.49 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.57
Observations 2416 2416 2416 2342 2416 2416 2416
R-squared 0.749 0.746 0.753 0.061 0.753
Number of countries 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Sargan test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000
1st order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000
2nd order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.6726 0.6862
Notes: Dependent variable is investment in columns (1)-(5) and (7); it is the change in investment in column (6); see Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions and sources. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by country, except for the GMM speciﬁcations in columns (4) and (5). All speciﬁcations include year dummies. FE: country
ﬁxed effects; Diff-GMM: Arrelano-Bond (1991) estimator; Sys-GMM: Blundell-Bond (1995)/Arrelano-Bover (1998) estimator; IV: using the share of Protestants and the share of
Catholics to predict UAI and use this predicted value in the model of column (3). *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
24 Calculated as 0.0376–1.12*0.134.
25 We also considered the Anderson-Hsiao estimator, which does not rely on the
number of cross-sections going to inﬁnity for consistency. This leads to very similar
results.
26 Despite the signiﬁcantly positive ‘Crises’ coefﬁcient, the marginal effect of crises on
investment is not signiﬁcantly positive for any of the countries in the sample.
27 The standard errors in columns (4) and (5) are robust to heteroscedasticity, but in
that case the distribution of the test for overidentifying restrictions is not known. The
p-value shown in Table 4 is based on estimation with homoscedastic errors. The errors
are very similar in both cases and homoscedastic errors are available on request.
28 The correlation between the crises dummy and a lagged difference of this dummy
is 0.02.
29 In the speciﬁcations of Table 4, all variables are treated as pre-determined. If all are
treated as endogenous, the crisis variables are no longer signiﬁcant. This could well be
a weak instrument problem.
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investment-output ratio do not distort themain ﬁnding that countries
that are less tolerant of uncertainty show bigger drops in investment
following a ﬁnancial crisis. The explanatory power of this speciﬁcation
is much lower than the regressions in levels, though at 0.061 not
negligible either.
So far,we have treated the tolerance for uncertainty as an exogenous
variable that moderates the effect of a crisis on investment. However, it
is conceivable that crisis-prone countries become less tolerant of
uncertainty, which makes the crisis variable the moderating variable.
To exclude this possibility, we instrument for uncertainty avoidance,
using the same approach asHuang (2008). FollowingHuang (2008), we
use the proportion of the population that is Catholic and the proportion
that is Protestant in 1980.30 Both variables turn out to be very relevant,
with more catholic societies showing higher rates of uncertainty
avoidance and more protestant societies showing lower rates of
uncertainty avoidance. Together, these two variables explain about a
quarter of cross-country variation in UAI. In column (7), we use the
values of UAI predicted by the two religious composition variables to
estimate the same model as in column (3). The results are very similar.
As expected, the coefﬁcient standard errors on the interaction terms are
considerably higher than without instrumenting UAI, but the marginal
effect of a ﬁnancial crisis on investment still is signiﬁcantly negative for
nearly the same group of countries.
5. Types of crises
We next address whether the effect of a ﬁnancial crisis differs
depending on the type of crisis: banking, currency or debt. This need
not be the case as each of these crises would likely lead to a period
of heightened uncertainty. Table 5 provides evidence for this by
separately including each of the three crisis dummies and lagged crisis
dummies in column (1) and adding the interactions with UAI in
column (2). Column (1) shows that all three crises have a signiﬁcant
negative effect on investment, either current, lagged or both. All three
have a comparable effect on investment when adding together the
current and lagged coefﬁcient estimates and indeed, the effect of
each type of crisis is statistically indistinguishable from the generic
crisis effect from Table 4. The coefﬁcients are less precisely estimated
than the combined crises dummy, which also suggests that each crisis
has a comparable effect: if each crisis had a very different effect on
investment, one would expect a less precise estimate after combining
the different crisis variables into a single crisis indicator.
Column (2) adds the interaction between the crisis dummies
and the uncertainty avoidance index. These interaction terms are
mostly insigniﬁcant, except for banking crises, but the main question
is whether the marginal effect of a crisis on investment turns sig-
niﬁcantly negative for the countries that most intolerant of uncer-
tainty. As the bottom panel shows, this is indeed the case. The group of
countries for which investment is signiﬁcantly lower after a crisis is
smaller in many cases, which is not surprising given the higher
coefﬁcient standard errors compared to Table 4. Indeed, a debt crisis
only has a signiﬁcant negative effect in the year in which it occurs, as
the effect of a lagged debt crisis never turns signiﬁcantly negative.31
6. Types of investment
So far, we have analyzed how the effect of ﬁnancial crises on total
investment varies across countries, but there are good reasons to
believe that this cross-country variation differs depending on the type
of investment. Speciﬁcally, we consider three distinctions:
1. By type of investor: public or private
2. By type of asset: structures or machinery
3. By type of industry: low or high volatility
The argument for a differential effect of crises on investment is based
on the theory of ﬁrm behavior. This theory argues that ﬁrmswill sooner
delay investments if the future payoff is highly uncertain (e.g. Bloom
et al. 2007). Such argumentswould a priori seem less plausible for public
investment,where theoverallﬁscalpolicy stanceanddebt sustainability
will matter more (see e.g. Mehrotra and Välilä, 2006). Table 6, columns
(2) and (3) conﬁrm this hypothesis. Column (2) shows that public
investment signiﬁcantly declines after a crisis for practically all
countries: only Singapore has a UAI that is smaller than 0.11, the
threshold shown. It is no surprise that public investment declines since,
in particular, debt crises would be expected to have an overall negative
impact of government ﬁnances and hence investment. In contrast, the
results for private investment in column (3) are very much in line with
those for overall investment.
The productive life span of capital assets vary considerably, with
structures oftenexpected tohave services lives of around40 yearswhile
the service life of machinery and equipment is typically closer to
15 years (see e.g. Fraumeni, 1997). This implies that uncertainty will
likely have a larger effect on the expected payoff of investments in
structures than in machinery and equipment. Columns (4) and (5) of
Table 6 conﬁrm this expected pattern. As detailed in the data appendix,
coming upwith reliable estimates for investment by asset for this range
of countries is challenging and the measures for structures investment
and machinery and equipment investment are both proxies, based on
the total supply of structures, and machinery and equipment. Since
these estimations are done independently, the number of observations
differs. The potential for measurement error is also greater since these
estimates cannot easily be linked to each other or to total investment in
the National Accounts. Still, the results conﬁrm the hypothesis: for
investment in structures we ﬁnd that only themore uncertainty-averse
countries show signiﬁcant declines while we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect
for investment in machinery and equipment.
Note: Marginal effect based on estimation results in column
(3) of Table 4 and calculated based on equation (2), using Stata’s lincom command.
Fig. 2.Marginal effect of a ﬁnancial crisis in the current year and one year ago (‘lagged’)
and 95% conﬁdence interval.
30 Huang (2008) also considered the proportion of the population that is Muslim, but
this variable turns out not to be a signiﬁcant explanatory variable for UAI. Dropping
countries without a sizable share of Christians (Protestant plus Catholic share less than
20%) does not affect the results.
31 In addition, the marginal effect of a currency crisis turns insigniﬁcant again for
very high levels of uncertainty avoidance, i.e. for the two countries with a UAI
exceeding 1.01.
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Industries may differ in their sensitivity to uncertainty from a
ﬁnancial crisis depending on the overall level of volatility in each
industry. Indeed, just as some industries may exhibit greater growth
opportunities than others (Bekaert et al., 2007), volatility of demand
and cost shocks or other factors may lead to variation in the volatility
of industries. Appendix Table 2 conﬁrms this, showing the standard
deviation of daily stock market returns for a range of industries. This
table shows how, for example, the leather industry is more than twice
as volatile as the food industry. We hypothesize that a ﬁnancial crisis
will have a greater effect in uncertainty-averse countries in industries
with low volatility, such as the food industry. The argument would be
that themore risk-averse investors will tend to invest in low-volatility
industries and are likely to respond more strongly to a ﬁnancial
crisis.32 Furthermore, a crisis increases total uncertainty by propor-
tionally more in low-volatility industries, so this might also lead to a
larger effect of a crisis.
Table 7 shows the regression results for industry investment.
Column (1) of Panel A shows that a ﬁnancial crisis has a negative
(unconditional) effect on investment and the coefﬁcient is quite close to
that in Table 4, column (1). A lagged crisis variable turned out not to be
signiﬁcant as did lagged industry growth, so these are omitted. Column
(2) adds the interaction of the crisis and country uncertainty avoidance
while column (3) also adds the interactions with stockmarket volatility
(see equation (4)). Panel B shows themarginal effects, ﬁrst correspond-
ing to the speciﬁcation from Column (2), based on equation (2), and
below that for Column (3), based on equation (5).
To interpret the results from the model with both uncertainty
avoidance and stock market volatility, we evaluate the marginal effects
at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentile for both variables. The
ﬁrst part of Panel B conﬁrms the cross-country ﬁndings by showing that
only themost uncertainty-averse countries show signiﬁcant declines in
investment after a ﬁnancial crisis. The threshold at which investment
turns signiﬁcantly negative is at a higher UAI level (0.73), but the result
is qualitatively similar. The bottom part of Panel B adds the industry
volatility dimensionand shows that any signiﬁcantnegative effect is still
dependent on the degree of uncertainty aversion in the country in
question but also on the volatility of the investing industry. Consistent
with the hypothesis, the signiﬁcant negative effects are concentrated in
the less volatile industries, with highly volatile industries showing no
signiﬁcant effect. These results are particularly powerful since they
show a differential effect within countries depending on the degree of
industry volatility.33
7. Alternative economic variables
Table 8 analyzes a wide range of variables that have been
suggested as explanatory variables for investment, notably in Joyce
and Nabar (2009). The ﬁrst column replicates the main estimation
result, column (3) from Table 4. Every subsequent column adds a
different control variable, described below the column number. The
key test is whether any of the control variables would remove the
moderating effect of uncertainty avoidance on crises. So each control
variable is interacted with crises and lagged crises and, as described in
equation (3), we evaluate the marginal effect of a crisis on investment
conditional on both uncertainty avoidance and the control variable. As
in earlier tables, we report the threshold value for uncertainty
avoidance, above which investment declines signiﬁcantly following a
ﬁnancial crisis. We determine this threshold at the mean of the
control variable and the 25th and 75th percentile.34
The list of control variables includes the (nominal) interest rate,
inﬂation rate, degree of trade openness, debt service to GDP ratio, FDI to
GDP ratio, changes in the termsof trade,ﬁnancial openness andﬁnancial
development. There are instances where the control variable or the
interaction of the control variable is signiﬁcant, but uncertainty aversion
remains important in moderating the effect of a ﬁnancial crisis on
investment. Indeed, the threshold value only variesmodestly across the
alternative models and for different values of the control variable.
8. Alternative sample and uncertainty measures
Table 9 considers the robustness of our results to different subsets
of countries (columns (2) and (3)); an alternative source for the
dependent variable (column (4)); and alternative measures of
uncertainty avoidance (columns (5)–(11)). Column (2) limits the
sample to low-income countries, i.e. non-OECD countries, and
column (3) removes Latin American countries, the more crisis-
prone countries in the dataset. Column (4) uses the investment/GDP
ratio as given in the World Development Indicators (WDI). In our
main results, we calculate the investment/GDP ratio using constant
prices data to focus on the adjustment of the quantity of investment
rather than the value. The WDI measure, used by Joyce and Nabar
Table 5
Investment, different types of ﬁnancial crisis and uncertainty avoidance.
(1) (2)
Lagged investment 0.842*** 0.842***
(0.0163) (0.0167)
Lagged growth 0.249 0.241
(0.155) (0.152)
Bank crisis −0.0329 0.114**
(0.0216) (0.0573)
Lagged bank crisis −0.0797*** 0.0230
(0.0180) (0.0578)
Currency crisis −0.0532*** −0.0480
(0.0190) (0.0560)
Lagged currency crisis −0.0326** 0.00645
(0.0150) (0.0634)
Debt crisis −0.0539** 0.120**
(0.0248) (0.0601)












Lagged debt crisis×UAI −0.0889
(0.115)









Number of countries 74 74
Notes: Dependent variable is investment; see Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions and
sources. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by
country. Both speciﬁcations include year and country dummies. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05,
* pb0.1.
32 See e.g. Barsky et al. (1997) and Dohmen et al. (2011) on risk preferences and
investment behavior. A corollary of this argument would be that uncertainty-averse
countries would have a larger share of investors preferring low-volatility industries, an
implication we are not analyzing here.
33 Furthermore, these ﬁndings are robust to dropping individual industries.
34 Evaluating the control variables at the 5th and 95th percentile does not materially
alter the ﬁndings.
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(2009), is measured at current prices, so any effect includes both a
price and quantity effect. The results are very similar to our baseline
results, shown in column (1).
Column (5) excludes all countries for which Hofstede had no direct
survey evidence; i.e. countries annotated with asterisks in Table 3.
This has little effect on the results. In columns (6) through (8), we use
the UAI data from the Hoppe and EMMS survey and the risk-loving
measure from the WVS. Columns (9) through (11) are based on pre-
dicted values of uncertainty avoidance and risk preference. As in the
ﬁnal column of Table 4, we use the Catholic and Protestant shares to
estimate the relationship between Catholic and Protestant shares and
UAI/risk-loving and predict their values for all 74 countries. This way,
we hope to focus on the effect of using a different survey distinct from
the effect of more limited country coverage.
The three alternative measures in columns (6)–(8) show lower
thresholds, i.e. a larger number of countries that show signiﬁcant
declines in investment after a crisis. The WVS risk-loving measure
even implies declines for all countries, though signiﬁcantly larger
Table 6
Investment by type of investor and type of asset, ﬁnancial crises and uncertainty avoidance.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total investment Public investment Private investment Structure investment Machinery & eq. investment
Lagged investment 0.842*** 0.764*** 0.860*** 0.879*** 0.694***
(0.0166) (0.0552) (0.0240) (0.0119) (0.0917)
Lagged growth 0.253* 0.302 0.0811 0.279*** 0.174
(0.152) (0.204) (0.316) (0.0801) (0.289)
Crises 0.0376 −0.180* 0.0553 0.0368 −0.00444
(0.0490) (0.102) (0.0613) (0.0302) (0.108)
Lagged crises 0.0176 0.0777 0.0266 −0.00430 0.110
(0.0466) (0.0977) (0.0628) (0.0306) (0.0951)
Crises×UAI −0.134** 0.0959 −0.176* −0.100** −0.0281
(0.0644) (0.162) (0.0925) (0.0470) (0.138)
Lagged crises×UAI −0.112* −0.164 −0.140 −0.0179 −0.160
(0.0606) (0.149) (0.0860) (0.0420) (0.145)
Marginal effect of a crisis signiﬁcantly negative for countries with a UAI exceeding
Contemporaneous 0.56 0.11 0.54 0.61 .
Lagged 0.49 . 0.53 . .
Observations 2416 933 933 2348 1822
R-squared 0.753 0.723 0.782 0.839 0.578
Number of countries 74 39 39 72 69
Notes: Dependent variable is listed below the column numbers; see Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions and sources. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered by country. All speciﬁcations include year and country dummies. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
Table 7
Investment by industry, ﬁnancial crises, uncertainty avoidance and industry volatility.
Panel A, Regression estimates
Model (1) (2) (3)
Lagged industry investment 0.581*** 0.581*** 0.581***
(0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0353)








Observations 29777 29777 29777
R-squared 0.344 0.344 0.344
Country×industry pairs 1585 1585 1585
Panel B, Marginal effects
UAI 0.29 0.48 0.68 0.86 1.01
(percentile) (5th) (25th) (50th) (75th) (95th)
Marginal effect of a ﬁnancial crises conditional on country UAI, column (2)
0.001 −0.02 −0.043 −0.062** −0.079**
Marginal effect of a ﬁnancial crises conditional on industry volatility and country UAI, column (3)
Volatility (percentile)
0.0069 (5th) 0.16 0.074 −0.016 −0.097** −0.164***
0.0082 (25th) 0.099 0.038 −0.026 −0.084*** −0.132***
0.0101 (50th) 0.011 −0.014 −0.041 −0.064*** −0.084**
0.0111 (75th) −0.036 −0.042 −0.049* −0.054** −0.059
0.0154 (95th) −0.237 −0.161 −0.082 −0.011 0.049
Notes:
Dependent variable is industry investment; see Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions and sources. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by
country×industry pair. All speciﬁcations include country×industry dummies and year dummies. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
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declines in countries with a greater aversion to risk-taking (for lagged
crises). Using the predicted values of the measures in columns (9)–
(11) shows the Hoppe and EMMS thresholds at very similar levels as
for the original Hofstedemeasures and similar results as in column (8)
for the WVS measure. This suggests that for the same set of countries
and the same concept (uncertainty avoidance) the results are very
similar. The WVS measure is conceptually somewhat different,
focusing on risk-taking rather than uncertainty avoidance, but even
there the results are broadly in line.
9. Institutional variables
We would argue that our results so far have established that ﬁrms
in more uncertainty-averse countries respond differently to ﬁnancial
crises than those in less uncertainty-averse countries. However, this
still raises the question what is behind this effect. On the one hand,
uncertainty aversion may directly affect the investment decisions of
ﬁrm owners. Alternatively, uncertainty aversion may give rise to
institutions that reduce uncertainty but increase adjustment costs of
ﬁrms. One example of such an institution is employment-protection
legislation.35 More broadly, uncertainty aversion could be correlated
with measures of governance quality, which would mean our ﬁndings
could reﬂect poor government response to a crisis.
We would argue the systematic differences across industries in
Table 7 suggests our main ﬁndings are related to how ﬁrm owners
respond to uncertainty, rather than how they respond to the
institutional setting. If ﬁrms were responding only to the institutional
setting, it is not clear why this response would vary between more
and less volatile industries. Table 10 provides more direct evidence
against institutional factors driving the investment response. Columns
(2)–(4) examine the effect of three ‘institutional rigidity’ indicators,
while columns (5)–(10) examine indicators of governmental quality.
The ‘institutional rigidity’ indicators include the aforementioned
employment protection indicator from Botero et al. (2004), which is
based on the strictness of regulations regarding hiring, ﬁring and
working hours; an indicator for legal formalism from Djankov et al.
(2003), which reﬂects to what extent legal decisions can rely on
principles of equity rather than law; and a dummy variable from La
Porta et al. (2004) that is one if previous legal decisions can be used as
a source of law. If case law can be used, the legal system tends to be
more adaptable. Higher values for the formalism and employment
protection measures indicate less ﬂexible systems.
The indicators of government quality are those of Kaufman
et al. (2010) and cover six dimensions: 1) voice and accountability;
2) political stability; 3) government effectiveness; 4) regulatory
quality; 5) rule of law; and 6) control of corruption. Along all these
dimensions, higher values correspond to higher quality, stability,
etc. Results for these dimensions are available annually for the
1996–2009 period but since this covers only a small part of our
sample period, we decided to average over the 1996–2009 period
and use this as an indicator for the entire 1970–2005 period.
Table 8
Investment, ﬁnancial crises and uncertainty avoidance: robustness to alternative explanatory variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Control variable - Interest rate Inﬂation Trade Openness Debt service FDI Terms of trade Fin. Openness Fin. Develop.
Lagged investment 0.842*** 0.810*** 0.844*** 0.836*** 0.833*** 0.827*** 0.835*** 0.827*** 0.842***
(0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0156) (0.0177) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0178) (0.0220) (0.0231)
Lagged growth 0.253* 0.216 0.423*** 0.252* 0.468*** 0.374** 0.618*** 0.238 0.402*
(0.152) (0.196) (0.141) (0.143) (0.155) (0.143) (0.0986) (0.154) (0.223)
Crises 0.0376 0.0314 0.0201 0.0954 0.0533 0.0166 0.00107 0.0870 0.0370
(0.0490) (0.0491) (0.0401) (0.0811) (0.0641) (0.0523) (0.0468) (0.0546) (0.0484)
Lagged crises 0.0176 0.0351 4.81e-05 0.0662 0.0183 -0.0297 -0.0241 0.0486 0.0132
(0.0466) (0.0509) (0.0513) (0.0563) (0.0571) (0.0591) (0.0360) (0.0476) (0.0609)
Crises×UAI -0.134** -0.107 -0.114* -0.160** -0.174** -0.122** -0.0955 -0.168** -0.115*
(0.0644) (0.0690) (0.0591) (0.0773) (0.0722) (0.0549) (0.0689) (0.0672) (0.0650)
Lagged crises×UAI -0.112* -0.153** -0.0860 -0.131** -0.108 -0.0736 -0.0467 -0.146** -0.0976
(0.0606) (0.0698) (0.0658) (0.0602) (0.0720) (0.0726) (0.0485) (0.0604) (0.0737)
Control 0.000461 -0.000172 0.103** -0.0510 0.162** 0.0144 0.000680 -0.866
(0.00113) (0.00131) (0.0422) (0.149) (0.0655) (0.0573) (0.0259) (2.606)
Control×Crises -0.0336 -0.00230 -0.0738 0.0398 0.360 0.111 -2.269* -4.436
(0.0229) (0.00234) (0.0646) (0.255) (1.621) (0.141) (1.219) (3.601)
Control×Lagged crises 0.00572 -0.000388 -0.0670 0.0214 1.352* 0.0156 -0.686 -3.372
(0.0122) (0.00214) (0.0409) (0.122) (0.771) (0.102) (0.858) (2.985)
Marginal effect of a crisis signiﬁcantly negative for countries with a UAI exceeding
Evaluated at the mean for Control
Contemporaneous 0.56 0.59 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.42 0.54 0.43
Lagged 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.44 0.55 0.59 0.34 0.51 0.44
Evaluated at the 25th percentile for Control
Contemporaneous 0.66 0.46 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.42 0.63 0.56
Lagged 0.51 0.48 0.56 0.56 0.42 0.34 0.54 0.53
Evaluated at the 75th percentile for Control
Contemporaneous 0.61 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.42 0.56 0.39
Lagged 0.51 0.48 0.41 0.55 0.57 0.33 0.51 0.40
Observations 2416 1625 2301 2416 1234 2036 2042 2253 2021
R-squared 0.753 0.734 0.772 0.758 0.770 0.747 0.776 0.734 0.744
Number of country 74 70 74 74 44 71 72 73 72
Notes: Dependent variable is investment; see Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions and sources. The lines ‘Control’ , ‘Control×Crises’ and ‘Control×Lagged crises’ show the coefﬁcient
estimate of the control variable listed at the top of the relevant column (interest rate, inﬂation, etc.). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by
country. All speciﬁcations include year and country dummies. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
35 See Bloom (2009) on how labor adjustment costs can affect the response of capital
investment to demand conditions.
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Table 9
Investment, ﬁnancial crises and uncertainty avoidance: robustness to alternative samples and data source for investment and uncertainty avoidance.







Hoppe UAI EMMS UAI WVS Risk-
loving
Pred. Hoppe Pred. EMMS Pred. WVS
Lagged
investment
0.842*** 0.849*** 0.846*** 0.725*** 0.814*** 0.833*** 0.859*** 0.883*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845***
(0.0166) (0.0188) (0.0201) (0.0323) (0.0160) (0.0218) (0.0160) (0.0183) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0163)
Lagged growth 0.253* 0.257 0.171 0.439** 0.898*** 0.590*** 0.845*** 0.618*** 0.274* 0.271* 0.272*
(0.152) (0.198) (0.140) (0.210) (0.126) (0.159) (0.0884) (0.0993) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155)
Financial crisis 0.0376 0.0673 0.00219 0.0331 -0.0117 -0.0689 -0.0741* -0.0817*** -0.0598 0.00190 0.0159
(0.0490) (0.0562) (0.0591) (0.0627) (0.0362) (0.0439) (0.0388) (0.0141) (0.0821) (0.0616) (0.0524)
Lagged ﬁnancial
crisis
0.0176 0.0167 -0.0342 0.00593 0.0167 -0.0146 0.000867 -0.0332*** 0.115 0.0758 0.0224
(0.0466) (0.0517) (0.0437) (0.0652) (0.0526) (0.0373) (0.0340) (0.0108) (0.0884) (0.0551) (0.0471)
Financial
crisis×UAI
-0.134** -0.174** -0.0627 -0.132 -0.0987* 0.00512 0.0333 -1.208 0.00633 -0.0977 -15.97
(0.0644) (0.0740) (0.0754) (0.0865) (0.0526) (0.168) (0.0382) (2.106) (0.216) (0.0976) (10.78)
Lagged ﬁnancial
crisis×UAI
-0.112* -0.105 -0.0221 -0.0841 -0.0971 -0.164 -0.0936* -3.887** -0.480** -0.231*** -19.14**
(0.0606) (0.0687) (0.0580) (0.0954) (0.0652) (0.105) (0.0458) (1.446) (0.228) (0.0845) (9.323)
Marginal effect of a crisis signiﬁcantly negative for countries with a UAI exceeding
Contemporaneous 0.56 0.61 0.67 0.59 0.31 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.26 0.46 0.01
Lagged 0.49 0.52 0.41 0.58 0.55 0.18 0.47 0.01 0.32 0.48 0.01
Observations 2416 1464 1872 2284 1598 612 510 1252 2416 2416 2416
R-squared 0.753 0.766 0.751 0.616 0.809 0.803 0.860 0.842 0.746 0.747 0.746
Number of
countries
74 46 58 74 47 18 15 38 74 74 74
Notes: Dependent variable is investment; see Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions and sources. Baseline speciﬁcation in column (1) corresponds with column (3) from Table 4. Column (2)
excludes OECD countries; column (3) excludes Latin American countries; column (4) uses the log of the investment to GDP ratio from the World Development Indicators (WDI);
column (5) excludes countries where the Hofstede UAI score in Table 3 is marked with one or two asterisks; column (6) uses the Hoppe UAI scores from Table 3; column (8) uses the
WVS scores from Table 3; column (7) uses the EMMS UAI scores from Table 3; column (9) uses the predicted value of the Hoppe UAI score where the prediction is based on the
relationship between the shares of Protestants and Catholics for the 18 countries of the Hoppe UAI sample; and column (11) performs the same procedure for the WVS indicator;
column (10) performs the same procedure for the 15 countries of the EMMS UAI sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by country. All
speciﬁcations include year and country dummies. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
Table 10
Investment, ﬁnancial crises and uncertainty avoidance: robustness to rigid institutions and government quality indicators.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Control variable - Emp. Protect. Formalism Case law Voice Stability Effectiveness Reg. Qual. Rule of Law Corruption
Lagged investment 0.842*** 0.861*** 0.847*** 0.856*** 0.842*** 0.842*** 0.843*** 0.843*** 0.842*** 0.843***
(0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0198) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166)
Lagged growth 0.253* 0.302 0.227 0.176 0.251* 0.254* 0.253* 0.253* 0.252 0.252
(0.152) (0.244) (0.163) (0.152) (0.150) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.151) (0.151)
Crises 0.0376 -0.0151 0.0395 0.00462 -0.00455 0.0346 0.0298 0.0241 0.0270 0.0233
(0.0490) (0.0462) (0.0688) (0.0430) (0.0424) (0.0514) (0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0593) (0.0459)
Lagged crises 0.0176 0.0504 0.0677 -0.0127 0.00655 0.0189 0.0188 0.0198 0.0269 0.0213
(0.0466) (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0416) (0.0521) (0.0480) (0.0464) (0.0459) (0.0504) (0.0482)
Crises×UAI -0.134** -0.167** -0.111 -0.0908 -0.0730 -0.132** -0.121* -0.109* -0.121 -0.116*
(0.0644) (0.0662) (0.0702) (0.0627) (0.0577) (0.0641) (0.0614) (0.0616) (0.0727) (0.0618)
Lagged crises×UAI -0.112* -0.126** -0.0943 -0.0979* -0.0970 -0.113* -0.114* -0.116* -0.123* -0.117*
(0.0606) (0.0514) (0.0572) (0.0527) (0.0685) (0.0616) (0.0613) (0.0614) (0.0657) (0.0636)
Control×Crises 0.136 -0.00726 -0.0332 -0.0479** -0.00704 -0.0272* -0.0353** -0.0137 -0.0212
(0.109) (0.0189) (0.0331) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0146) (0.0159) (0.0219) (0.0147)
Control×Lagged crises -0.0486 -0.0150 0.0223 -0.00692 0.00409 0.00641 0.00831 0.0118 0.00648
(0.0658) (0.0125) (0.0233) (0.0133) (0.0125) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0135) (0.0132)
Marginal effect of a crisis signiﬁcantly negative for countries with a UAI exceeding
Evaluated at the mean for Control
Contemporaneous 0.56 0.55 0.51 0.34 0.39 0.59 0.47 0.46 0.60 0.47
Lagged 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.40 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53
Evaluated at the 25th percentile for Control
Contemporaneous 0.42 0.56 0.80 0.81 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.55 0.61
Lagged 0.55 0.57 0.39 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.49
Evaluated at the 75th percentile for Control
Contemporaneous 0.78 0.54 0.31 0.20 0.71 0.37 0.35 0.69 0.42
Lagged 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.54 0.57 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.63
Observations 2416 2014 2252 1748 2416 2416 2416 2416 2416 2416
R-squared 0.753 0.790 0.766 0.775 0.754 0.753 0.754 0.754 0.753 0.754
Number of country 74 61 68 52 74 74 74 74 74 74
Notes: Dependent variable is investment; see Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions and sources. The lines ‘Control×Crises’ and ‘Control×Lagged crises’ show the coefﬁcient estimate of the
control variable listed at the top of the relevant column. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by country. All speciﬁcations include year and
country dummies. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
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The set-up of Table 10 is the same as Table 8, except that because
the control variables are not time varying, only interactions with
crises and lagged crises are included. Of main interest are themarginal
effects, evaluated at the mean, 25th and 75th percentile of the control
variable.36 Our results remain robust throughout: investment only
declines signiﬁcantly after a ﬁnancial crisis in the most uncertainty
averse countries. In other words, our differential effect does not seem
to be driven by more rigid institutions or less effective government,
but may instead directly reﬂect the preferences of ﬁrm owners.
10. Conclusions
Financial crises tend to have severe effects on the real economy,
leading to substantial drops in output and investment. What we set
out to show in this paper is that the degree to which investment falls
after a crisis differs signiﬁcantly across countries depending on their
tolerance for uncertainty. We have shown that after a crisis,
investment falls no faster than GDP in countries with a high tolerance
for uncertainty. Conversely, in countries with a low tolerance for
uncertainty, investment falls signiﬁcantly faster than GDP.
This result can be understood by considering that a ﬁnancial
crisis of any sort is a major source of uncertainty. A ﬁrm or household
facing increased uncertainty would often prefer to wait for more
stable times rather than commit money to an investment. Put
differently, the real option value of waiting increases following an
uncertainty shock like a ﬁnancial crisis. Analysis of the macroeco-
nomic effects of uncertainty shocks is relatively new, but the work of
Bloom (2009) shows these effects can be considerable. Our analysis
ﬁts well into this framework.
Our main effect, investment declines signiﬁcantly in the more
uncertainty-averse countries, is similar for each type of ﬁnancial crisis.
We also ﬁnd this effect only for private investment; that it is stronger
for (long-lived) investment in structures; and only for manufacturing
industries that are inherently less volatile. Furthermore, our ﬁndings
are not driven by governments in more uncertainty-averse countries
adopting less ﬂexible institutions, suggesting that ﬁrm owners in
more uncertainty-averse countries weigh the real option value of
delaying investment differently from those in less uncertainty-averse
countries.
This ﬁnding is relevant for policy. It may well be impossible to
avoid all negative effects from a ﬁnancial crisis, but a large drop in
investment would be particularly harmful for long-run economic
growth as it hampers capital accumulation. Avoiding such a drop in
investment is particularly pressing in countries where the uncertainty
aversion is high according to our ﬁndings. In these countries,
conﬁdence-building measures following a ﬁnancial crisis, such as
IMF agreements or rapid restructuring of sovereign debt, would be
particularly pressing.
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Data Appendix
This appendix describes in some more detail the data sources,
choices and assumptions made in constructing some of the variables
listed in Table 1.
Public and private investment
There are broadly two approaches to distinguishing public and
private investment: the ﬁrst deﬁnes investment by institutional sector
and the second by industry; see e.g. Kamps (2006). This distinction is
best understood when considering education. Education is a distinct
industry (economic activity), but it can be both privately and publicly
funded. As a result, part of education will be in the government sector
and part in the private sector. As a practical matter though, collecting
data on investment by industry results in a more comprehensive
country coverage, so we opted for that approach.
Our main data source is the United Nations (UN) National Accounts
Ofﬁcial Country Data publication, which provides data on gross ﬁxed
capital formation by the public administration industry and total
economy investment. The public administration industry corresponds
to ISIC division L and hence excludes health and education to focus on
government investments, such as infrastructure. In addition to this
source, we collected information from the EU KLEMS industry
database (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009) for Japan and the National
Accounts of Argentina. Together, this provided us with data for 39
countries on the share of public investment. This share, based on data
at current prices, was applied to our investment series at constant
prices from the UN National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates
publication (for both UN publications, see data.un.org). This assumes
that the price trends for public and private investment are the same,
as we lack the necessary data on investment prices.
Structures and machinery & equipment investment
Although data on investment by asset type is available for a range of







Investment 2564 −1.54 0.36
Growth 2490 0.03 0.06
Public investment 1004 −4.02 0.95
Private investment 1004 −1.62 0.24
Structure investment 2492 −1.92 0.49
Machinery & eq. investment 1960 −2.54 1.03
Industry investment 33456 −2.09 1.28
WDI I/Y 2438 −1.52 0.31
Interest rate 1724 0.22 1.26
Inﬂation 2464 0.29 1.97
Trade Openness 2564 0.70 0.54
Debt service 1317 6.24 4.86
FDI 2163 2.75 15.86
Terms of trade 2123 −0.46 15.20
Fin. Openness 2402 2.38 10.99
Fin. Develop. 2171 0.51 0.39
Emp. Protect. 2196 0.46 0.19
Formalism 2448 3.67 1.00
Case law 1872 0.62 0.49
Voice 2664 0.21 0.95
Stability 2664 0.04 0.94
Effectiveness 2664 0.51 0.96
Reg. Qual. 2664 0.50 0.86
Rule of Law 2664 0.15 0.97
Corruption 2664 0.42 1.07
Note: For variable deﬁnitions see Table 1. For descriptive statistics for ﬁnancial crisis
variables see Table 2 and Appendix Fig. 1. For other country-level variables, see Table 3.
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coverage. So instead, we construct measures of the total supply of the
investment assets based on industry output and international trade
data. This is most straightforward for structures, since this is
practically non-traded and most of industry output is used for
investment.
This can be illustrated using data for the United States in 2005 from
the Annual Make-Use Tables published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Construction industry output was $1180 bln and total
investment in structures totaled $1363 bln. There are three main
‘wedges’ between these two numbers: 1) the construction industry
does not produce all construction ‘products’ of the economy (in the US
in 2005, 10%was produced by other industries); 2) some construction
‘products’ are used as intermediate inputs (13%); and 3) investment in
structures also consists of other ‘products’, such as architectural
services (15%). What matters most, though, is not the size of these
wedges, but whether construction industry output and structures
investment follow similar trends over time. Data for the US suggests
they do: the growth rates of these two series show a 0.96 correlation.
More challenging is machinery and equipment investment since
these products are traded and their use is more widespread. Again
using the US in 2005 as an illustration, we calculate the supply of
machinery and equipment investment goods as the sum of industry
output and imports and subtract exports. We include manufacturing
industries that produce machinery and transport equipment. Of this
total supply, 40% is used as investment, 42% as intermediate use and
the remainder as consumption. But despite this much larger ‘wedge’,
the trend in machinery & equipment supply and investment is still
very similar with a correlation of 0.86 between the growth rates of
these series.
To estimate total supply of structures, we take value added (at
constant prices) of the construction industry from the UN National
Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates publication and combine it with
estimates of the gross output/value added ratio from the UN National
Accounts Ofﬁcial Country Data publication, the EU KLEMS database and
IO tables from the GTAP 7 database. Dividing by GDP at constant prices
gives the variable used in estimation.
To estimate total supply of machinery and equipment, we collect
value added for overall manufacturing; gross output and value added
for machinery & equipment industries; and exports and imports. The
output data are from the UNIDO INDSTAT3 and INDSTAT4 (ISIC rev.2
and ISIC rev.3) databases and the trade data are from the Feenstra et al.
(2005) World Trade Flows (WTF) database with an update for more
recent years. The UNIDO data would frequently have a gap of one or
more years, breaking the time series. We therefore supplemented
UNIDO data with other sources, such as EU KLEMS but we also
interpolated small gaps when the trade data suggested that no sharp
movements occurred. Finally, to put the series on a comparable price
basis as for structures investment, we calculated total supply as a share
of manufacturing value added (at current prices) using UNIDO and
WTF and applied it to manufacturing value added at constant prices
from the UN National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates publica-
tion. Dividing by GDP at constant prices gives the variable used in
estimation.
Industry investment and volatility
The UNIDO INDSTAT3 database contains information on both
industry gross ﬁxed capital formation and value added. The database
covers manufacturing industries at the 3-digit level, which provides
us with data for 28 industries, and covers the period 1970–2003.
Moreover, the database contains data for 66 out of the 74 countries in
this study. Although there are a considerable number of gaps and
missing industries, more than 75% of the industry/country pairs have
data for at least 10 years.
To measure industry volatility, we used a range of sectoral stock
indexes from Datastream. These are available since 1973 and can be
used to compute the standard deviation of daily stock returns. The
Datastream stock market indexes were matched to the (ISIC rev. 2)
industry list by name and in some cases the same index was matched
to more than one industry, see Appendix Table 2. The matching is
available on request.
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